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For several years, a major controversy has existed in the law of
torts concerning the right of a plaintiff bystander to recover for mental
and emotional distress suffered as a consequence of witnessing either
danger or actual injury to a third person caused through a defendant's
negligence.' Typically, the question of recovery has arisen in the
context of familial relationships as in the case of a mother, near the
scene of an accident, who views her child being struck and injured by a
negligently driven automobile and suffers mental anguish at the sight.
Although this situation would seem to produce a favorably sympa-
thetic reaction for the plaintiff in any court, quite the opposite result has
proven to be the general rule. The law has been slow in extending
completely independent tort protection to such witnesses for their mental
injuries. A major problem which has inhibited the growth of the law in
this area has been the difficulty in formulating a standard of duty which
will allow recovery in the appropriate cases of bystander injury, yet not
subject the negligent party to essentially unreasonable and unlimited
liability exposure to an endless number of potential plaintiffs who,
although not directly harmed by the defendant's negligent act, nonethe-
less suffer mental distress as a result of it.
1. The extensive amount of literature dealing with this subject reflects the inten-
sity of the legal discussion which has surrounded this issue. See generally W. PRossFn,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PRossER];
Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli,
30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case
for an Independent Tort, 50 Guo. L.J. 1237 (1970-71); Note, Negligent Infliction of
Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California and Other States, 25 HAs-
rINGS L.J. 1248 (1974); Note, Traumatic Mental Injury and the Bystander, 24 S.C.L.
REv. 439 (1972); Note, Torts-Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-The Right of
Bystanders to Recover Upon Witnessing Injury or Peril of Third Persons-Damages, 4
ST. MARY's L.J. 424 (1972); Note, Torts-Recovery for Physically Manifested Mental
Distress-Towards a More Liberal Negligence Approach, 10 WAKE FoRsr L. REv. 187
(1974).
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Recently, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Kelly v. Kokua Sales &
Supply, Ltd.,2 had an opportunity to consider the implications of this
problem when it was presented with a unique situation in which the
mental distress providing the basis for the suit was suffered by a
"bystander" located thousands of miles from the accident scene. Al-
though this case involved an unusual variation of the bystander situa-
tion, the underlying factual elements were tragically familiar.
A mother and her two children were involved in a traffic accident
in Hawaii with the defendant's truck. As a result, the mother and one
child were killed and the other child severely injured. The cause of the
fatal collision was attributed to brake failure of the defendant's vehicle.
Several hours after the accident, Theodore Kelley, a California resident
and the father-grandfather of the victims, was advised by telephone of
their deaths. Shortly thereafter, as a result of his severe mental anguish
over the accident, Mr. Kelley suffered a fatal heart attack. The dece-
dent's wife, as administratrix of her husband's estate, and his children
filed suit in Hawaii against several defendants 3 basing the action on the
tort theory of negligent infliction of serious mental distress. Plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants had owed a duty of care to the decedent and
that their combined negligence in the traffic accident had proximately
caused Mr. Kelley's severe mental distress and subsequent death.4
The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendants. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the lower court decision
and refused to allow recovery for the decedent's emotional and physical
distress, holding that the injuries were not foreseeable and that to allow
recovery in such cases would confront negligent tortfeasors with "an
unmanageable, unbearable and totally unpredictable liability."'5
This note will analyze the substantive importance of Kelley in
attempting to establish more definite yet flexible limits to bystander
2. - Hawaii -, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
3. Because of the alleged brake failure, the plaintiffs sued a variety of defendants
besides Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd. They included: Oahu Turf & Sprinkler Company,
the company that had owned and operated the truck involved in the accident; Erling
W. Hedemann, Jr., and Lonnie Williams, principals in Koolau Nursery & Landscaping;
International Harvester Company, manufacturer of the truck involved; Hawaiian Equip-
ment and Castle & Cooke, Inc., Who had leased the trailer to Oahu Turf & Sprinkler
Company; George Kenney, mechanic for the truck; Ian Tekare, temporary administra-
tor of the estate of Anthony Tekare, deceased; George K. Hirata, dba Standard Auto
Service, who inspected the truck involved and issued a safety sticker for it; City and
County of Honolulu and State of Hawaii, who granted the driver the license to operate
the type of vehicle involved in the accident. Id. at -, 53Z P.2d at 674.
4. Id. at-, 532 P.2d at 674.
5. Id. at -, 532 P.2d at 676.
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RECOVERY FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
recovery and will examine, evaluate and contrast the approaches taken
by the Hawaii court and other jurisdictions in their efforts to balance the
respective interests of the plaintiff bystander 6 and 'the negligent defend-
ant.
BACKGROUND-THE TRADITIONAL ViEw
American courts have expressed differing views in confronting the
bystander recovery issue with some jurisdictions denying recovery out-
right,7 others permitting it within strict limits' and still others allowing it
liberallyY The varying positions taken have, in large measure, resulted
from the different interpretations courts have developed in analyzing the
concepts of duty, foreseeability and proximate cause. The conservative
courts have adopted restrictive views of these traditional negligence
determinants. In focusing upon the mental distress issue, they have
perceived the duty owed by defendants to bystanders to be either
nonexistent or extremely limited. Correspondingly constrained views
have been expressed about the foreseeability of such mental disturbances
to witnesses of an accident and about the limits to which the actionable
effects of the negligent act will be allowed to extend. Conversely, the
more liberal jurisdictions have expanded both the duty and foreseeabili-
ty concepts to allow recovery for emotional distress which has resulted
merely from witnessing a traumatic scene.10
The traditional approach, often referred to as the "impact theory,"
has been to deny the right to maintain an action for negligent infliction
of mental distress to plaintiffs who have not suffered an actual physical
impact by the negligent force." This view, currently followed by a
6. Bystanders for the purpose of this note will be broadly defined to include not
only those who actually witness the accident but also those who either happen upon the
accident subsequent to its occurrence or, as in Kelley, learn of the tragedy after it has
happened.
7. See note 12 infra.
8. See note 26 infra.
9. California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Michigan and Rhode Island. See notes 28-47
infra and accompanying text.
10. 38 Am. Jun. 2D Fright, Shock, etc. §§ 15, 16 (1968).
11. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), is generally con-
sidered the leading decision in establishment of the impact rule in the United States.
In that case, the court stated:
Assuming that fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is obvious that no
recovery can be had for injuries resulting therefrom. That the result may be
nervous disease, blindness, insanity, or even a miscarriage, in no way changes
the principle. . . . [No recovery can be had for injuries sustained by fright
occasioned by the negligence of another, where there is no immediate personal
injury.
id. at 109-10, 45 N.E. at 354-55. See also Southern v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E.
28 (1916); West Chicago St. R.R. v. Liebig, 78 Ill. App. 567 (1898); Smith v. Gowdy,
1976]
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dwindling minority of courts, 12 has been rationalized on grounds of
various policy considerations. It has been contended that mental dis-
turbances are not equivalent in severity to demonstrable physical injuries
and therefore not entitled to the same degree of legal redress and
protection.'2 Further, it has been suggested that to allow recovery for
mental distress in the absence of an actual physical impact would result
in a flood of easily feigned and unfounded claims of injury, the validity
of which both medical practitioners and the courts would have difficulty
determining, since direct and visible evidence of the negligent contact
would be lacking.' 4 Finally, it has been stated that any mental injuries
suffered by a witness to an accident would be unforeseeable and that
therefore no duty of care would be owed to the plaintiff.'5  Although
the harsh effects of this theory have been softened to some degree by
allowing recovery for mental distress where there have been slight and
even absurd "impacts,"' 6 the fact that some impact, no matter how
trivial, is required, effectively precludes any recovery for accident wit-
196 Ky. 281, 244 S.W. 678 (1922); Herrick v. Evening Express Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138,
113 A. 16 (1921); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Cohn
v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914); Miller v. Baltimore
& O.S.W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908); Mack v. South Bound R.R., 52
S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898); Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932). See
generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959); 38 AM. Jun. 2D Fright, Shock, etc. § 13
(1968).
12. PRossER, supra note 1, § 54, at 331 lists the states of Arkansas, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Virginia and
Washington as continued adherents to the impact rule. However, a number of recent
decisions indicate that this number has been further reduced. The following states have
recently rejected the impact rule: Florida in Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Maine in Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d
117 (Me. 1970); Michigan in Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970);
Virginia in Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973). Although the lan-
guage is somewhat unclear, the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Shurk v. Chris-
tensen, 80 Wash. 2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972), suggests that Washington also can no
longer be considered an impact jurisdiction.
13. See generally 38 Am. Jun. 2D Fright, Shock, etc. § 18 (1968).
14. Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Nelson v. Craw-
ford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,
45 N.E. 354 (1896).
15. This is succinctly expressed in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110,
45 N.E. 354, 355 (1896).
16. Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (de-
fendant's horse "evacuated his bowels" into the plaintiff's lap); Philadelphia, B &
W.R.R. v. Mitchell, 107 Md. 600, 69 A. 422 (1908) (impact against clothing of the
plaintiff); Jansen v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 112 Minn. 496, 128 N.W. 826 (1910)
(slapping plaintiff over the head with a hat); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 73
N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in the eyes); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115,
170 N.E. 869 (1930) (smoke passing through the plaintiff's nostrils); Hess v. Philadel-
phia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948) (electrical shock).
[V7ol. 11:587
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RECOVERY FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
nesses who have suffered impacts only in the sense of an emotional
disturbance.
Several judicial opinions have attacked both the rationality and
reasonableness of the impact requirement and its purported usefulness
in guaranteeing the legitimacy of injuries. 17 Typical of the criticisms is
the comment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Niederman v.
Brodsky' in its rejection of the impact rule as arbitrary and illogical:
It appears completely inconsistent to argue that the medical
profession is absolutely unable to establish a causal connec-
tion in the case where there is no impact at all, but that the
slightest impact . . . suddenly bestows upon our medical
colleagues the knowledge and facility to diagnose the causal
connection between emotional states and physical injuries. 19
Other assaults have been directed against the inequitable effects
which result from application of the impact theory. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, in the leading case of Falzone v. Busch,20 observed that
it was unjust and totally inconsistent with established judicial concepts
of providing relief where a meritorious injury has been suffered to bar
an entire class of claims merely because of the potential for a few
dishonest ones. 1 Moreover, as one authority has indicated, "it is a
pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to
deny relief upon the ground that it will give the court too much work to
do."22 Additionally, it has been contended that the massive increase in
claims that was feared has not materialized in those jurisdictions which
have foresaken the impact requirement 23 and that, in any event, substan-
tial refinements in modem techniques for diagnosing and determining
the legitimacy of both mental and physical injuries have reduced the
opportunity for imposition of fraudulent claims upon the courts.24
17. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Green v. Shoemaker
& Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909); Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d
390 (1970); Chuichiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540
(1930); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Si-
mone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 A. 202 (1907); Mack v. South Bound R.R.,
52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898); Trent v. Barrows, 55 Tenn. App. 182, 397 S.W.2d
409 (1965); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967).
18. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
19. Id. at -, 261 A.2d at 87 (footnote omitted).
20. 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
21. Id. at--, 214 A.2d at 16.
22. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MicH. L.
Rav. 874, 877 (1939) (footnote omitted).
23. See, e.g., Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969).
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Although certainly an arbitrary concept, the impact rule was and
remains useful to those courts which have retained it, because by their
denial of recovery to an entire group of plaintiffs, it enables them to
dispense with the difficult problem of determining which bystanders
shall or shall not recover. As those jurisdictions which have rejected the
impact rule have discovered, once the impact requirement is removed,
other standards must be formulated to govern the extent of bystander
recovery and defendant liability.
That some limits must be established seems clear, for while it is
unjust to totally prohibit any recovery at all to witnesses who have
suffered justifiably compensable mental disturbances, it is just as in-
equitable to hold a defendant liable for every remote manifestation of
his negligent act. One eminent authority has stated:
It would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human
activity if the defendant who has endangered one man were
to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other
person disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander
shocked at an accident, and every distant relative of the per-
son injured, as well as his friends.2 5
Tm MAJORITY APPROACH
In dealing with this issue, the majority of courts which now permit
recovery for bystander mental distress have adopted the "zone of dan-
ger" concept which allows recovery if the plaintiff, while suffering
mental anguish upon observing either danger or actual injury to another,
simultaneously entertains a fear for his own safety and is within the
same zone of physical danger as the victim. 28  This rule appears to have
attained its popularity primarily because it provides courts with an
mhe question of proving or disproving causation between the claimed injuries
and damages and the alleged fright or shock may indeed have been a difficult
undertaking in 1888 when the impact rule was first announced. Such is not
the situation today. An extensive review of medical treatises is not necessary
in order to recognize that medical science has come a long way since the turn
of the century; the changes brought about by modern scientific techniques and
the advancement made by modern medicine have been overwhelming. This is
particularly true in the refinement of techniques for diagnosing the causal con-
nection between emotional states and physical injuries.
Id. at 472.
25. PRossER, supra note 1, § 54, at 334.
26. See Hopper v. United States, 244 P. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965) (interpreting
Colorado law); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513,
29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965);
Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559,
214 A.2d 12 (1965); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419. 301 N.Y.S.2d
554 (1969); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969); Waube v. War-
rington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 143 (1959).
[Vol. 11:587
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RECOVERY FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
opportunity to give some measure of relief to the plaintiff-witness within
relatively defined boundaries while at the same time limiting the defend-
ant's scope of duty and ultimate liability to those who are foreseeably
within the orbit of danger.
Efforts to permit recovery beyond the rigid lines of the zone of
danger have repeatedly been resisted because of the fear that once
recovery is allowed outside the zone of danger, there would be no
rational method to limit recovery and defendants then would be subject-
ed to a degree of liability out of proportion to their culpability.2"
Notwithstanding this concern, there is a growing trend to move away
from the zone of danger rule toward a utilization of more flexible and
liberal standards of recovery.
Ti LIBERAL MOVEMENT
The first jurisdiction to specifically reject the zone of danger rule
was California in Dillon v. Legg.2" In overruling its earlier holding in
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.29 in which it had adhered to the
zone of danger rule, the supreme court in Dillon held that recovery
should be granted to a plaintiff-mother for the mental and subsequent
physical distress she suffered as a result of witnessing her daughter's
death in an automobile accident, although she herself had suffered no
actual impact and was outside the zone of physical danger. In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted the harsh and arbitrary result which
would ensue from application of the zone of danger rule to the factual
situation in Dillon. For although both the mother and a sister of the
victim had witnessed the accident and suffered essentially the same
traumatic mental injuries, the sister would be allowed to recover since
she had been within the zone of danger, while the mother, just outside
the zone, would be denied any recompense at all.30
Recognizing the implications of its holding, the court attempted to
allay fears of creating a situation of unlimited liability of defendants by
establishing a set of criteria to limit the extent of bystander recovery,
basing it upon the defendant's foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff.
The factors cited as crucial in this determination were:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the acci-
dent as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
27. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
28. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
29. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
30. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
19761
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(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional im-
pact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous ob-
servance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plain-
tiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an
absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship."
In formulating this standard, the court indicated that each case would
have to be resolved by application of the criteria to the particular factual
situation presented to the court.32
Although the approach taken in Dillon has provided increased
flexibility in determining bystander recovery, reaction to this decision
has generally indicated that other jurisdictions have not been persuaded
that the barriers erected to prevent unreasonable imposition of liability
upon defendants adequately achieve that goal. The majority of courts
which have considered the Dillon holding have rejected it. 3 The New
York Court of Appeals in Tobin v. Grossman,3 4 in declining to follow
the Dillon lead employed reasoning which generally reflects the majority
opinion in this area. In expressing the concern that the limits of
recovery could be progressively expanded under the Dillon rationale due
to a lack of established parameters, the court stated:
Any rule based solely on eyewitnessing the accident could
stand only until the first case comes along in which the parent
is in the immediate vicinity but did not see the accident.
Moreover, the instant advice that one's child has been killed
or injured, by telephone, word of mouth, or by whatever
means, even if delayed, will have in most cases the same im-
pact. The sight of gore and exposed bones is not necessary
to provide special impact on a parent. . . . [T]he logical
difficulty of excluding the grandparent, the relatives, or others
in loco parentis, and even the conscientious and sensitive care-
taker, from a right to recover, if in fact the accident had the
31. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
32. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
33. Jelly v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968); Whetham v. Bismarck
Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d
12 (1969). The Court of Appeals of New Mexico in Aragon v. Speelman, 83 N.M.
285, 491 P.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1971), refused to adopt the Dillon holding but indicated
a willingness to reconsider its position if it was presented with the appropriate case in
which to do so. The Washington Supreme Court in Shurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash.
2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972), expressed a similar sentiment. It is apparent that the
Washington court has not yet found the appropriate case. Its recent decision in
Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975), expressly rejected the Dillon
rationale.
34. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
[Vol. 11:587
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grave consequences claimed, raises subtle and elusive hazards
in devising a sound rule in this field.35
The fears expressed in Tobin appeared well founded in light of a
California appellate court decision which, one year after Dillon, con-
cluded in Archibald v. Braverman3" that actual witnessing of the tor-
tious act by the bystander was not necessary before recovery would be
granted. In Archibald, a mother sued to recover damages for her
emotional distress suffered as a consequence of viewing her son's inju-
ries sustained in an explosion which had just occurred but had not been
witnessed by the plaintiff. In holding for the plaintiff, the court ap-
peared to disregard the fact that there had, been no "sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident,"3 7 one of the criterion to
recovery explicitly mentioned in Dillon. Archibald exemplified the diffi-
culties inherent in creating and consistently applying rules to limit re-
covery once the zone of danger distinction has been removed. Al-
though the California courts in two subsequent cases3" declined to
further expand recovery beyond -the parameters established in Archibald,
this attitude of judicial restraint has not resulted in any increased ac-
ceptance of the Dillon approach by those courts initially hostile to it.
To date, only a few jurisdictions have adopted the general philo-
sophy of liberalized bystander recovery outlined in Dillon. It is ap-
parent from a review of these decisions that controversy continues about
the acceptability of the rules established by .the California court and
problems remain in devising guidelines to recovery outside the zone of
danger. Only Connecticut, in D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co.,39 has
accepted without modification the Dillon approach.40 The Court of
35. Id. at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
36. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
37. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
80 (1968,).
38. Wynne v. Orcutt Union School Dist., 17 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 95 Cal. Rptr. 458
(1971) (parents of terminally ill child alleged they had suffered mental distress after
the boy's schoolteacher had made an ill-advised disclosure of the child's condition to
his classmates who then questioned the child about his illness. The child, who was un-
aware of his condition, then asked his parents if he was going to die. The parents al-
leged that this questioning by their child was the seminal cause of their distress. In
denying recovery the court distinguished the case from Dillon by indicating that there
was no alleged injury to the child and no breach of duty in disclosing the information
to his classmates. Id. at 1111, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 459); Deboe v. Horn, 16 Cal. App.
3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971) (recovery denied plaintiff-wife who neither witnessed
the accident nor arrived at the scene after it occurred, but who alleged mental distress
as a result of being informed of her husband's condition when summoned to the hospi-
tal).
39. 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (Super. Ct. 1973).
40. Id. at -, 326 A.2d at 130.
1976]
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Appeals of Michigan, in noting that it was difficult and practically im-
possible to create definite rules for limiting bystander recovery has con-
cluded that it will simply evaluate each case as it is presented and de-
termine from an examination of its facts whether recovery is warranted
or not.41  The decisions of the Rhode Island federal district court in
D'Ambra v. United States,42 and the Hawaii Supreme Court in Rodri-
gues v. State4" and Leong v. Takasaki44 have provided the most com-
plete -analysis and greatest contrast in their consideration of the criteria
utilized in Dillon.
In D'Ambra recovery was allowed for a mother who had suffered
emotional distress accompanied by physical symptoms as a consequence
of seeing her infant son struck and killed by a mail truck. In rejecting
both the impact and zone of danger requirements, the court accepted the
three criteria approach of Dillon toward determining foreseeability but
added a fourth element by requiring that the presence of the bystander
also be foreseeable by the negligent party. In this determination, the
court indicated several factors that should be considered: (1) the age
of the child; (2) the type of neighborhood in which the accident had
occurred; (3) the tortfeasor's familiarity with the neighborhood; (4) the
time of day; and (5) any other factors which would put the defendant
on notice of the plaintiff-witness' presence. 45 In thus concluding that
foreseeability of the bystander's presence as well as foreseeability of in-
jury had to be shown before recovery would be allowed, the D'Ambra
court endeavored to further restrict the duty owed by the defendant there-
by limiting the extent of his liability within boundaries more conservative
than those suggested in Dillon.40
41. Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973). The court
stated:
We note at the outset that devising one hard and fast rule for limiting by-
stander recovery in mental suffering cases would be difficult and complex if
not impossible. However, we need not and indeed should not attempt to pose
and solve a myriad of hypothetical factual situations relative to cases of this
nature which may or may not arise in the future. The problem of limiting
liability will be best surmounted and will be more justly resolved for all con-
cerned by treating each case on its own individual facts.
Id. at -, 207 N.W.2d at 144-45.
42. 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973).
43. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
44. 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
45. 354 F. Supp. at 820.
46. The continued vitality of the presence element formulated by the district court
in D'Ambra is subject to some doubt, at least in the jurisdiction of Rhode Island. Af-
ter the district court's decision, an appeal was taken to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit. In attempting to determine whether the district court had
correctly construed Rhode Island law, the court of appeals certified to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court the question whether the factual situation in D'Ambra would entitle the
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HAwAi's ANALYSIS OF THE MENTAL
DIsTR ss IssuE
Hawaii, in contrast to the conservatism expressed in D'Ambra, has
on the basis of the Rodrigues and Leong decisions exceeded California
in becoming the most liberal jurisdiction permitting bystander recovery.
In Rodrigues, the Hawaii Supreme Court allowed compensation for the
emotional injuries suffered by the plaintiff homeowners in viewing the
severe flood damage caused to their home as a result of the state's
negligence in failing to promptly clear a blocked drainage culvert. In
concluding that recovery was warranted even in situations where the
mental distress did not result in physical injury, the court recognized
that an individual's interest in freedom from negligent infliction of
serious mental distress was entitled to independent legal protection.4
The opinion did not distinguish between mental distress suffered as a
consequence of witnessing injury to another and that suffered by view-
ing destruction of one's own property.
The liberal movement begun in Rodrigues was continued and
expanded in Leong, a case involving the more traditional situation of
bystander injury. The plaintiff, a ten-year-old child, saw his stepgrand-
mother being killed as they crossed a highway. Although not physically
injured, an action was brought on his behalf to recover damages for his
nervous shock and psychic injuries suffered in witnessing the fatal
accident. 8 The trial court dismissed the action on the grounds that
plaintiffs to recover. The supreme court in D'Ambra v. United States, - R.I. -, 338
A.2d 524 (1975), answered in the affirmative but expressed some reservations about the
presence element established by the district court:
[The district court] added to the Dillon factors the requirement that the presence
of the plaintiff be foreseeable. While this addition may be theoretically neces-
sary to make the outward limits of the duty conform to the risk reasonably to
be perceived . . . it should be realized that the scope of liability is or should
be determined by more factors than those relevant only to a defendant's culpa-
bility. To require that the presence of the plaintiff or mother be "foreseeable"
would mean distinguishng [sic] between the case of a very young child whose
mother may be presumed to be about and the teenaged victim who is pre-
sumed to be on his own . . . between a mother witnessing the accident from
behind a tree and a mother standing in full view of the defendant-driver. While
the outside limitations of the cause of action must of necessity be somewhat
arbitrary, they need not be completely irrational.
Id. at -, 338 A.2d at 531 n.7 (citation omitted). This is not to suggest that the pres-
ence element has lost all significance; it reflects an evolutionary development in this
area of the law and may be persuasive logic for other courts.
47. 52 Hawaii at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
48. The plaintiff had never consulted a doctor for treatment of the alleged mental
disturbance. However, the court concluded that the "plaintiff's statements that his
grades in school had dropped immediately after the accident but had subsequently risen
to their previous level and that he thinks about the accident at times are indications of
possible psychic damage." 55 Hawaii at -, 520 P.2d at 761.
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there could be no recovery for mental distress without resulting physical
injury. The supreme court reversed and affirmed its previous holding
in Rodrigues that mental distress did not have to manifest itself physical-
ly before recovery would be allowed. Furthermore, the court estab-
lished the new principle that absence of a blood relationship between the
victim and the plaintiff-witness was an insufficient reason to automati-
cally foreclose recovery by the plaintiff.49  Upon remand, the plaintiff
should therefore be permitted the opportunity to prove both the nature
of his relationship to the victim and the extent of mental distress he had
suffered as a result of viewing her death.50
The explicit findings in Rodrigues and Leong that a plaintiff
bystander may recover for mental distress which has not resulted in
physical injuries and which may have been produced by shock at
viewing destruction to an inanimate object or witnessing the death of a
non-blood related victim, taken alone, indicate a substantial movement
beyond Dillon. However, the greatest difference between the Hawaii
court and California and Rhode Island courts concerns the methods
used to determine recovery and liability in bystander situations.
In a distinct departure from the rule oriented approaches toward
foreseeability established in Dillon and D'Ambra, the Hawaii court has
not established a distinct set of rules to govern bystander recovery, but
has instead employed the indefinite "reasonable man" standard in ascer-
taining the foreseeability of injury, the extent of the duty owed and in
determining the issue of proximate causation. This unwillingness to
follow the approaches of the California and Rhode Island courts was
explained in Leong. In observing that the Dillon and D'Ambra tests
focused on foreseeability standards rather than on a proximate cause
standard, the Leong court indicated that their criteria would not be
controlling in Hawaii, since making recovery contingent upon the de-
fendant's actual knowledge of the plaintiff's presence was merely estab-
lishing another variant of the zone of danger concept. "[Fjoreseeabili-
ty of [the bystander's] and the victim's presence to the defendant should
not be employed by a trial court to bar recovery but should at most be
indicative of the degree of mental stress suffered."' '
In both Leong and Rodrigues, the court concluded that the issues
of liability and recovery would be determined by concentrating on the
49. Id. at-, 520 P.2d at 766.
50. Id.
51. Id. at-, 520 P.2d at 766.
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degree of mental distress suffered by the bystander. Recovery in both
cases was based upon the premise that serious mental distress could
result from the defendants' negligent actions. In Leong, the court
explained the application of this concept:
[W]hen it is reasonably foreseeable -that a reasonable plain-
tiff-witness to an accident would not be able to cope with the
mental stress engendered by such circumstances, the trial
court should conclude that defendant's conduct is the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiffs injury and impose liability on the de-
fendant for any damages arising from the consequences of his
negligent act.52
Although it did not develop any specific time and spatial factors to
indicate more precisely the extent to which liability would be expanded
or limited, the court felt that by restricting recovery to only those
situations in which serious mental distress had resulted from the negli-
gent act, it had established a suitable standard for permitting liberal
recovery while preventing the extension of liability beyond reasonable
limits.5 3 The conclusion is inescapable that the court's reliance upon
this standard was based upon the belief that usually severe mental
distress could only be suffered by a plaintiff who had actually witnessed
the negligent act and had been present at the scene of the accident. The
reasonableness of the severity of mental distress standard was subjected
to a severe test when the court was presented with the atypical and
plainly unanticipated factual situation in Kelley.
The perplexing problem faced by the court was how to reconcile its
established standard to the Kelley facts. In Rodrigues and Leong the
court had determined that one owed the duty of care to refrain from the
negligent infliction of serious mental distress. In those two cases the
issue of liability had been analyzed primarily by a consideration of the
severity of the mental distress suffered by the plaintiffs. Consistent
application of this same reasoning to Kelley could only have resulted in
a favorable decision for the plaintiffs. Clearly, any mental injury which
resulted in a fatal heart attack constituted mental distress sufficiently
severe to permit recovery under the liberal interpretations of Rodrigues
and Leong. Since serious mental distress had resulted, logically, it
would follow that the defendants' had breached their duty and were
liable for the decedent's injury. While conceding that the language
used in Leong could have been construed to mean that the defendants
52. Id. at - 520 P.2d at 765.
53. Id. at-, 520 P.2d at 764-65.
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owed a duty of care to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious
mental distress upon a person located anywhere in the world, the Kelley
court avoided such an unreasonable result by recognizing that merely
focusing upon the severity of the mental distress suffered would not
realistically limit the liability of the defendants.54
Consequently, the court recognized the need to augment its pre-
vious standard and accordingly treated Kelley as an opportunity to
further delineate the scope of duty owed by negligent parties." The
court indicated that liability would be imposed for negligent infliction of
serious mental distress only when the plaintiff's injuries were reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant." In applying this analysis to Kelley, the
court stated:
[A] reevaluation of the various considerations pertinent to the
question of an untrammeled liability of the appellees leads this
court to conclude, as a matter of law, that the appellees did
not owe a duty to refrain (duty of care) from the negligent
infliction of serious mental distress upon Mr. Kelley.
Stated in a different terminology, but reaching the same
conclusion as above, we hold that the appellees could not rea-
sonably foresee the consequences to Mr. Kelley. Clearly,
Mr. Kelley's location from the scene of the accident was too
remote.57
The court concluded that the duty of care outlined in Rodrigues and
Leong would be applied in any future cases where the plaintiffs met the
standards stated in those decisions and were located within a reasonable
distance from the scene of the accident.""
The dissenting justice contended that the standard previously es-
tablished should have been consistently applied in determining liability
in Kelley.' 9
I believe that Rodrigues and Leong sufficiently defined the
boundaries of liability by only allowing claims for serious
54. - Hawaii at -, 532 P.2d at 676.
55. In this regard the court noted:
In both [Rodrigues and Leong], this court adhered to the principle that
where the serious mental distress to the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's negligent act, the defendant is liable.
However, while this duty exists, the problem of the delineation of the
scope of duty (the question as to which particular plaintiffs, proximate-wise to
the scene of the accident, is the duty owed) remains for resolution.
Id. at -, 532 P.2d at 675.
56. Id. at-, 532 P.2d at 676.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at -, 532 P.2d at 677 (Richardson, C.J., dissenting).
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mental distress. The facts on the record are particularly com-
pelling and well established the genuineness and seriousness
of mental distress. This is not a situation which merely caused
emotional trauma short of physicial injury .... There can
be no doubt that said decedent suffered mental distress se-
vere enough in impact so as to induce a fatal heart attack.
I cannot contemplate a result which renders appellees' alleged
negligence blameless at the outset and which summarily denies
recovery by decedent's surviving widow and children. 0
In concluding his argument, he criticized the effect of the majority's
holding as a reestablishment of "a scheme of arbitrary distinctions as to
where liability ends" that had been expressly rejected in Rodrigues.61
Although absolute consistency in the application of legal standards
is generally a laudable goal, the dissent's argument for such strict
consistency in determining liability in Kelley appears unreasonable in
view of the factual situation present in that case. Under his view, the
final result of the defendant's negligence-the severity of mental distress
suffered by the injured party-would be the controlling consideration in
determining liability. In the absence of any geographical and time
limitations between the occurrence of the tortious act and its ultimate
consequences, it seems apparent that this would not be a logical method
in all cases to restrain the extension of liability beyond reasonable limits.
The Kelley majority realistically recognized that liability could not
be extended to provide recovery for every remote manifestation of the
negligent act, no matter how severe the mental distress suffered by the
remote party. In reaching the cohclusion that some scheme of time and
location must be utilized to govern witness recovery, the court did not
adopt the more defined standards of either Dillon or D'Ambra, but
instead determined that a plaintiff-bystander must be located within a
reasonable distance from the scene of the accident before his mental
distress will be actionable.
Through the utilization of the indefinite term "reasonable," it is
apparent that the court did not wish to place precise and absolute limits
on the geographical parameters to be established but desired instead to
retain the flexibility of judgment permitted through the use of the
"reasonable" standard. Clearly, a contrary finding would have negated
the entire underlying basis of the earlier decisions in Rodrigues and,
more particularly, in Leong wherein the court strongly expressed the
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inclination to avoid the development of rigid and arbitrary barriers
toward determining bystander recovery."' What denotes a reasonable
distance presumably will be decided by the court as it contemplates the
various factual situations presented to it in future cases. Ultimately, as
the court itself indicated, questions concerning reasonable proximity and
the scope of duty owed must be resolved by weighing the considerations
of policy which favor the bystander's recovery against those which favor
limiting the negligent party's liability. 3
In balancing those interests in Kelley, the court firmly decided that
the policy considerations favored a limitation on the defendants' liabili-
ty. The significance of this finding should not be minimized. With its
holding the Hawaii court has established more specific yet flexible limits
to the outward expansion of liability evidenced in Rodrigues and Leong
and has created increased predictability in the application of its standard
by the exclusion of remote and geographically distant plaintiff claims for
mental distress. In view of the fears which have been expressed about
the inability of courts to limit liability without resort to restrictive
standards of recovery, Kelley is persuasive evidence that, even in the
absence of strict and arbitrary rules, courts can and will rationally limit
the extension of liability when it is reasonable and necessary to do so.
By showing that even a very liberal court will not continually ex-
tend the parameters of a defendant's liability to unreasonable limits, the
Kelley decision may encourage some jurisdictions, like Oklahoma, which
have been hesitant about adopting more liberal standards in this area, to
reappraise their positions and possibly move toward development of
more equitable and less arbitrary methods of determining bystander
recovery for mental distress.6 4
62. 55 Hawaii at-, 520 P.2d at 766.
63. - Hawaii at -, 532 P.2d at 675.
64. Oklahoma has consistently adhered to a conservative position with respect to
the right of a plaintiff-bystander to recover for his mental distress in witnessing injury
to another. The leading Oklahoma case on this subject is Van Hoy v. Oklahoma Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 205 Okla. 135, 235 P.2d 948 (1951). In Van Hoy, the plaintiff gave
a bottle of Coca-Cola containing a dead mouse to his friend. The friend became ill; the
plaintiff alleged that this, in turn, frightened him, causing severe mental distress accom-
panied by nausea and stomach aches. In denying the plaintiff recovery, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court stated what remains the definitive law in Oklahoma:
"'In law mental anguish is restricted, as a rule, to such mental pain or suffer-
ing as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished
from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy
or sorrow for another's suffering or which arises from a contemplation of
wrongs committed on the person of another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a
husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused by his or her
sympathy for the other's suffering. Nor can a parent recover for mental dis-
tress and anxiety on account of physical injury sustained by a child or for
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CONCLUSION
Courts continue to struggle in their attempts to resolve the issue of
how far a defendant's liability should be extended to provide recovery
for the mental distress suffered by bystanders. Although there is unan-
imity in the belief that some limits must be developed to govern the
extent to which liability will be imposed upon negligent wrongdoers,
divergent opinions exist concerning what those limits should be and how
they should be determined.
The arbitrary and frequently unjust results which ensue from at-
tempts to define absolutely the limits of liability, as exemplified in the
impact and zone of danger theories, suggest that new standards must be
implemented to produce a more equitable method of determining recov-
ery and liability in mental distress cases. Although it seems apparent
that it will be impossible to devise a system which is completely equita-
ble in all respects, this is not to suggest that attempts to do so should be
abandoned and a retreat made back to the conservative security of the
zone of danger rule. All aspects of -the law are continually evolving to
reflect the changes which occur in society at large. The same process
must continue in this highly controversial area of tort law.
Although the controversy will continue, it can be hoped that
increasing attention will be focused upon the Hawaii court's analysis of
the mental distress issue. The logical conclusions reached by that court
should provide a useful example of the type of standards which must be
developed to realistically and equitably resolve the conflicting goals of
affording plaintiffs the opportunity to recover for legitimate claims of
serious mental distress while, at the same time, limiting the actionable
effects of defendants' negligence within reasonable boundaries.
Timothy E. McCormick
anxiety for the safety of his child placed in peril by the negligence of another."'
Id. at 136, 235 P.2d at 949.
In view of the substantial recent developments in this area of the law in other juris-
dictions, it is hoped that the court will reanalyze its position when presented with an
opportunity to do so in a proper case.
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